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IN MEMORIAL 
 
 
On September 15, 2002, 31-
year-old Richmond (B.C.) 
RCMP Constable Jimmy Ng 
was on a routine call 
proceeding through a green 
light when a Honda Civic 
travelling at an extremely 
high rate of speed ran the red light striking the police 
car in the driver's door. Cst. Ng was extricated, 
treated, and transported by paramedics to hospital 
where he was pronounced dead. The suspect fled the 
scene and turned himself in at 
Richmond Hospital some hours later 
with his lawyer. Constable Ng was a 6 
year veteran of the RCMP. He is 
survived by his parents.  
 
On August 21, 2002, 41-year-old South Simcoe Police 
Service (Ontario) Constable Alan Kuzmich was on duty 
and investigating an incident involving a stolen 
motorcycle in the Town of Bradford, Ontario when he 
was struck by a motor vehicle and 
killed instantly. Constable Kuzmich 
had served as a police officer for 19 
years and is survived by his wife, 
Joanne and two children.  
 
The above information was provided with the 
permission of the Officer Down Memorial Page: 
available at www.odmp.org/canada 
 
CONSENT ENTRY WAIVES 
PRIVACY INTEREST: FEENEY 
ISSUES NOT ENGAGED 
R. v. C.K., 2002 MPBC 10019 
 
The police attended the accused’s 
a
 
 
informed her that they were there to arrest her son 
for the robbery.  The police were directed downstairs 
by the mother and told to wake up “the lazy bum”. The 
police entered the residence and were escorted to a 
basement bedroom by the mother who pointed to a 
male in bed. The accused was woken up and arrested 
without a warrant for the robbery.  The accused was 
provided the usual warnings, declined to contact 
counsel at that time, was handcuffed, and subsequently 
transported to the police station. 
 
During a voire dire, the accused unsuccessfully 
attempted to have his subsequent statements ruled 
inadmissible, in part, by the warrantless entry and in-
home arrest made by the police. Manitoba Provincial 
Court Justice Pullan found that the police were invited 
into the residence by the accused’s mother. The police 
were wearing clearly identifiable jackets and made 
their purpose (arrest) well known to the accused’s 
mother before entering the home. Although the police 
did not request entry, she invited them, escorted them 
through the house, and told them to wake him. Her 
consent was informed and she “made a reasoned choice 
to invite police into her residence to arrest her son”. 
Thus, the entry was lawful and the issues arising from 
the Feeney1 case were not engaged. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
DISCREPENCY BETWEEN NOTES 
& TESTIMONY DOES NOT 
WARRANT NEW TRIAL 
R. v. Swearengen, 
(2002) Docket:C35558 (OntCA) 
 
The accused was convicted of sexual 
assault at trial, but had the 
conviction overturned on appeal by 
V
Sresidence to arrest him for the 
armed robbery of a gas station, but 
did not know whether they would 
find him there.  The door was 
nswered by the accused’s mother and the police  
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Justice and a new trial was ordered. The Crown’s case 
was dependent on the victim’s version of the assault 
while the accused’s case was dependent on his denial of 
                                                 
1 [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 
 it. The appeal court justice found that the victim’s 
“testimony at trial contained several material 
assertions that were not contained in the notes a police 
officer made of a statement made by the [victim] 
immediately after the alleged assault”. The 
discrepancies between the notes and the testimony on 
material matters was sufficient to require a new trial 
since findings of credibility may well have been 
different had the victim been properly cross examined 
on her previous statement. The Crown appealed to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal which set aside the order for 
a new trial. In restoring the conviction, Justice 
Catzman for the unanimous appeal court held: 
 
In our view, the mere fact that the notes taken by the 
police officer of the complainant’s initial statement are 
different in material respects from the complainant’s 
testimony does not, standing alone, warrant a new trial. 
Differences between the statement and the testimony 
do not, in and of themselves, provide a basis for the 
reassessment of the [accused’s] credibility. The effect, 
if any, of the notes on the complainant’s credibility would 
depend on many factors, including for example, the 
nature of the notes and the complainant’s response to any 
alleged inconsistency. None of these factors were 
explored on the summary conviction appeal.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE 
BREATH SAMPLE AFTER ARREST 
NOT NECESSARY 
R. v. Tavangari,  
[2002] O.J. No. 3173 (OntCJ) 
 
A police officer, who stopped the 
accused driving, detected a strong 
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attempts resulted in an insufficient sample reading and 
lack of an audible tone, which is normally emitted when 
air is received into the device. The officer removed the 
mouthpiece and had the accused blow into it without 
difficulty. The mouthpiece was placed back onto the 
device and a further three attempts again resulted in 
an insufficient sample being provided. After the sixth 
attempt, the officer informed the accused it was a 
criminal offence to fail or refuse to provide a breath 
sample, he would receive a 90-day licence suspension if 
he failed to provide a sample, and that his vehicle would 
be towed. When asked if he understood the 
consequences, the accused responded, “Yes”.  
 
A seventh, eighth, and ninth test also resulted in an 
insufficient sample reading. The officer again 
demonstrated how to provide a sample and informed 
the accused that the tenth test would be his last. The 
accused again provided an unsuitable sample. Despite 
telling the accused he could provide no further tests, 
the officer administered an eleventh and twelfth test, 
also resulting in an insufficient sample. A thirteenth 
test was subsequently administered by another police 
officer using a different approved screening device, 
but again an insufficient sample reading resulted. After 
the thirteen opportunities to comply with the demand 
over a 29-minute period on two separate approved 
devices, the officer concluded that the accused had 
been provided ample opportunity to comply, terminated 
testing, and arrested him for failing to provide a 
breath sample. After the arrest, the accused then 
asked for a further opportunity to provide a sample.  
 
At trial the accused argued, “once a person has been 
arrested the police are required to provide a further 
opportunity [to provide a suitable sample] on request… 
regardless of the circumstances”. In rejecting the 
V
Sliquor odour on his breath and 
observed that his eyes were 
“glassy”. As a consequence, the 
fficer formed the suspicion that the accused was 
perating a motor vehicle with alcohol in his body and 
ade a demand under s.254(5) of the Criminal Code 
hat he provide a breath sample into an approved 
creening device. The device had been tested and found 
o be working by the officer at the commencement of 
is shift and again at the roadside in the presence of 
he accused.   
 new mouthpiece, checked by the officer for 
bstructions, was used. Even though the accused’s 
heeks were puffed out with air, the first three 
accused’s submission, Justice Kenkel of the Ontario 
Court of Justice found that the determination of 
whether a person has failed or refused to comply with 
a screening device demand will involve an examination of 
“all of the circumstances of the entire transaction 
between the police officer and the accused”. Although 
there may be cases where a subsequent post-arrest 
offer to comply with a demand may not amount to a 
failure or refusal to provide a sample, this was not one 
such case.  Here, the officer made “exhaustive 
efforts” to obtain a sample and a fourteenth test was 
not required as “there was no reasonable prospect that 
the accused would provide a suitable sample”. Justice 
Kenkel held:   
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 The accused had been warned in a very detailed way 
after the 6th test that failure to provide a suitable 
sample was a criminal offence. He was warned at that 
time in detail of the consequences of the failing to 
provide a suitable sample, including the administrative 
licence suspension and the towing of his car. Knowing this 
the accused failed 7 more times to provide a proper 
sample. Three of the final tests were administered after 
the accused was warned on the 10th test that there 
would be no further tests. The only inference available on 
the evidence before me is that the failures to provide a 
sample were deliberate and that [the accused] had no 
intention of providing a suitable sample despite his 
statements to the contrary. 
 
As a result, the accused was convicted of refusing or 
wilfully failing to provide a breath sample.  
 
THREAT REQUIRES EXPRESS or 
IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO 
DEATH or BODILY HARM 
R. v. Abdallah, 2002 ABPC 126 
 
The accused was charged with 
uttering threats to cause death or 
bodily harm under s.264.1(1)(a) of 
the Criminal Code arising from an 
incident where he was driving a 
vehicle stopped at an intersection, stuck his head out 
the window and yelled at the female victim, “Fucking 
bitch. I’m going to get you back for ratting me out”. 
The victim had previously provided a statement to the 
police alleging the accused had committed criminal 
offences. Although she was not afraid nor take the 
threat seriously, the victim pretended to call the police 
on her cell phone. Section 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal 
Code reads as follows: 
 
Every one commits an offence who, in any manner, 
knowingly utters, conveys or causes any person to 
receive a threat (a) to cause death or bodily harm to 
any person; … 
 
Bodily harm is defined in s.2 of the Code as “any hurt 
or injury to a person that interferes with the health or 
comfort of the person and that is more than merely 
transient or trifling in nature”.  
 
The actus reus of threatening is the uttering of the 
threat to cause death or bodily harm while the mens 
rea is whether the words spoken as a threat, to the 
reasonable person, were meant to intimidate or be 
taken seriously. In determining whether the words 
constitute a threat, the court must look at them 
objectively taking into account the circumstances and 
manner in which they were uttered as well as the 
person to whom they were spoken.  Words spoken in 
jest or in a manner in which they could not be taken 
seriously would not be a threat, since they could not 
lead a reasonable person to conclude they were meant 
to intimidate or to be taken seriously. Two questions 
arose at trial: 
 
1. Is it necessary that the victim take the threat 
seriously? and  
 
2. Did the words uttered constitute a threat to cause 
death or bodily harm as required in s.264.1(1)(a) of 
the Criminal Code? 
 
Must the threat be taken seriously? 
 
Following a review of the case law, Justice Semenuk of 
the Alberta Provincial Court concluded that it was 
“unnecessary for the complainant to take the threat 
seriously” or even that they appreciated that they were 
being threatened. All that is required is “that the 
accused meant the threat to intimidate or be taken 
seriously”. There is no requirement that the threat did 
in fact intimidate or that it was taken seriously.  
 
Did the words imply bodily harm? 
 
Although Justice Semenuk found the words uttered by 
the accused were meant to be taken as a threat, there 
was no explicit threat to cause death or bodily harm. In 
such cases where “the threat is not express the Court 
is left to draw an inference by necessary implication 
from the words used and all the surrounding 
circumstances as to whether it constitutes a threat to 
cause death or bodily harm”. In the Court’s view, the 
words uttered by the accused in this case were 
ambiguous and did not necessarily refer to death or 
bodily harm. Notwithstanding that the Court found the 
words used were meant to intimidate or be taken 
seriously, there was a reasonable doubt as to whether 
the threat implied death or bodily harm. As a 
consequence, the accused was acquitted. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
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 TRANSIT BUS DISTURBANCE 
CRIMINAL 
R. v. Mudarth, 2002 ABCA 176 
 
There are two types of leaders in the 
world today: those who are interested 
in the fleece, and those who are 
interested in the flock. 
Author unknown 
A police officer gave evidence at 
trial that as he approached an 
Edmonton transit bus and when he 
was inside it, he heard the accused, 
who was very upset, swearing and 
shouting at a transit employee. The officer testified 
that there were about 20 people on the bus who 
became “very interested” in what was occurring and 
supported his action in having the accused leave the 
bus. The officer offered to drive the accused 
wherever she wanted to go, but she refused. Since the 
accused refused to leave the bus and the police were 
concerned with her conduct, the transit passengers 
were transferred to another bus and the accused was 
arrested and removed. The accused was convicted of 
causing a disturbance under s.175(1)(a)(i) of the 
Criminal Code and her application to appeal to the 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench was dismissed. The 
accused further applied for leave to appeal to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal arguing that the trial judge 
erred in finding that a there was a disturbance and 
that it occurred in a “public place”.   
 
Section 175(1)(a)(ii) creates an offence for a person 
“who (a) not being in a dwelling-house, causes a 
disturbance in or near a public place, (i) by fighting, 
screaming, shouting, swearing, singing, or using insulting 
or obscene language”. Furthermore, s.175(2) allows the 
court to “infer that a disturbance was caused or 
occurred from the evidence of a peace officer”. The 
legal test for determining whether conduct amounts to 
a disturbance was settled by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R. v. Lohnes [1992] 1 S.C.R. 167: 
 
...the disturbance contemplated by s. 175(1)(a) is 
something more than mere emotional upset. There must 
be an externally manifested disturbance of the public 
peace, in the sense of interference with the ordinary and 
customary use of the premises by the public. There may 
be direct evidence of such an effect or interference, or 
it may be inferred from the evidence of a police officer 
as to the conduct of a person or persons under s. 175(2). 
The disturbance may consist of the impugned act itself, 
as in the case of a fight interfering with the peaceful use 
of a barroom, or it may flow as a consequence of the 
impugned act, as where shouting and swearing produce a 
scuffle. As the cases illustrate, the interference with 
the ordinary and customary conduct in or near the public 
place may consist in something as small as being 
distracted from one's work. But it must be present and it 
must be externally manifested. In accordance with the 
principle of legality, the disturbance must be one which 
may reasonably have been foreseen in the particular 
circumstances of time and place. 
 
In this case, the evidence of the police “established 
that the accused was swearing, using obscene language 
and shouting and that there were members of the 
public who heard it, reacted to it, and eventually were 
inconvenienced as a result of the [accused’s] conduct”. 
This fell within the definition set out in Lohnes. 
 
Section 175 also requires that the disturbance occurs 
“in or near a public place”. A “public place” is defined in 
s.150 of the Code as including “any place to which the 
public have access as of right or by invitation, express 
or implied”. Justice Picard of the Alberta Court of 
Appeal found “no error in the trial judge concluding 
that the ETS bus fell within s.175”. The application for 
leave to appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
TO SERVE & PROTECT: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR LEADERSHIP 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
“The measure of a person is not the number of servants 
they have, but the number of people they serve”. 
Author unknown 
 
Introduction 
 
The expression “to serve and protect” is a motto used 
by law enforcement agencies throughout North 
America. This motto, which not only reflects a police 
ideology, can also be used as a framework for 
leadership and provide a foundation from which an 
authentic leader can derive the necessary 
underpinnings to be effective.  As can be inferred from 
the maxim, this philosophy of leadership is rooted in 
two concepts; serving (those you lead) and protecting 
(the integrity of the leader/follower relationship).   
 
LEADING BY SERVING 
 
The “leading by 
serving” principle 
is underscored by 
asking the simple 
question, “How can 
I best serve those 
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 Leading by serving 
is janitorial, or a 
behind the scenes 
style of 
leadership. It is 
choosing service over 
servant leadership ar
determine the will of t
to advance that will, 
most followers want a
direction3. However, 
harvests the respect,
followers. When the t
or tough decision, the
respect of the group.  
around me?” However, this enquiry must be genuine, and 
not a Machiavellian approach; fraudulently expressing 
interest knowing it may be received by the follower as 
authentic. To best serve the follower, a leader must 
serve the needs of the ones they lead while at the 
same time also serve by setting an example.  
 
Serving the Needs of the Follower 
 
By definition, the terms “lead” and “serve” (or follow) 
pose a paradox. How can one lead or determine 
direction but also follow?  Quite simply, the role of the 
leader is not to impose their own will on others, but to 
remove the obstacles that block the group’s way in 
achieving the group’s goal. Thus the leader of the 
group, through facilitation, serves its members in their 
march forward. Michael Stanley described this servant 
leadership philosophy as “working your way to the 
bottom”2. He suggests that the traditional management 
pyramid be inverted; the leader at the bottom and the 
follower at the top. Thus the leader is now in a 
supportive role, to serve those responsible on the front 
line.   
 
 
Each member of a gro
The leader, in recogn
group’s needs, which ar
own. This does not pre
as a result of their ow
group and putting the
own, the leader will al
others before one’s own is serving oneself4 and true 
benefit blesses everyone, including the leader5. Thus, 
“enlightened leadership is service, not selfishness”6.  
                                
2 Stanley, Michael F. (1995). Se
lonely at the top when you’re lea
Issue 8, p.30. 
3 Kiechel III, W. & Rosenthal, M.
Issue 9, p.121 
 
Serving by Role Modelling 
 
A key to serving one’s followers is providing a model 
that the followers can look up to. The espoused values 
of the leader must be demonstrated through practice 
and by exhibiting high standards for followers. In the 
words of leadership guru Warren Bennis7, leadership is 
“character in action”. In the same vein, James O’toole8 
quotes popular Girl Scouts leader Frances Hesselbein 
whose comments are apposite: 
 
[L]eadership is basically a matter of how to be, not how 
to do it.  Leaders need to lead by example, with clear, 
consistent messages, with values that are ‘moral 
compasses’, and a sense of ethics that works full time 
(p.40)   
 
Author Perry Smith9 suggests that individuals within an 
organization will observe whether the leader is 
committed to what they value. Not only must the leader 
talk the talk, they must also walk the talk. The leader 
must act consistently with their values or their 
followers will not take them seriously10. To this end, 
leaders must be able to correlate vision and behaviour 
with values and “do the right thing in a moment of 
Volume 2 Issue 
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must walk as if behind them. 
se 66, Tao Te Ching  Verself-interest. The proponents of 
gue that the leader’s role is to 
he group and provide the support 
while the critics maintain that 
 leader “with a plan”; to set the 
through serving, the leader 
 trust, and confidence of their 
ime comes to make an unpopular 
 leader will have the support and 
up has individual personal needs. 
izing this, selflessly serves the 
e given priority over the leader’s 
vent the leader from benefiting 
n action, but by yielding to the 
 group’s well being above their 
so benefit. Serving the needs of 
                 
                                                
rvant leadership in the fire service; It’s never 
ding from the bottom. Fire Engineering, Vol, 148 
 (1992). The Leader as Servant. Fortune, Vol. 125 
truth”11. This congruity between value centredness and 
high standards of emulation is a cornerstone of 
leadership. Stephen Covey12 asserts that modelling 
(living your principles) is the foundation from which 
people come to believe in their leader. From this, 
relationships are built (mentoring) eventually leading to 
followers perpetuating the system and cultivating other 
leader/follower structures. The leader has thus 
started a cycle that continues among the followers who 
become leaders within their own circles of influence.  
 
 
4 Secretan, Lance. (2000). Honey or Vinegar. Industry Week, Vol. 249 Issue 12, 
p.23. 
5 Heider, John. (1985). The Tao of Leadership. Los Angeles, Ca.: Humanics Ltd. 
6 Spears, Larry. (1995). Reflections on Leadership: How Robert K. Greenleaf’s 
Theory of Servant Leadership Influenced Today’s Top Management Thinkers. 
Toronto, Ont.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
7 Bennis, Warren. (1999). Old Dogs, New Tricks. Provo, Utah: Executive Excellence 
8 O’Toole, James. (1995). Leading Change: Overcoming the Ideology of Comfort and 
the Tyranny of Custom. San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass Inc. 
9 Smith, Perry. (1998). Rules and Tools for Leaders: How to Run an Organization 
Successfully. Garden City Park, N.Y.: Avery Publishing Group 
10 Nanus, Bert (1989). The Leader’s Edge. Chicago, Ill.: Contemporary Books, Inc. 
11 Bennis, Warren. (1999). Old Dogs, New Tricks. Provo, Utah: Executive Excellence 
12 Covey, Stephen. (1991). The Seven Habits of Highly Effective Families. New 
York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster Inc. 
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 LEADING BY PROTECTING 
 
To determine the value of a 
leader, you must look at who’s 
doing the following. 
Author unknown 
Leaders not only 
need to serve their 
followers but must 
also protect the 
integrity of the 
leader/follower arrangement.  Every system of 
leadership has three key stakeholders; the follower, 
the leader, and the relationship. The system could be 
an organization, a family, or a team. To protect or 
safeguard this system, a leader must protect the 
shared values that the system stands for, protect the 
individuals within that system, and protect the 
relationship between the leader and the follower. 
 
Protecting Shared Values 
 
The idea of protecting values as a basis for leadership 
has been challenged. The detractors of this theory 
argue that it is simply a pleasant, but unrealistic, 
concept. They claim that in the name of inclusion and 
mutual respect, organizational decision-making is 
delegated to the will of the many, destroying discipline 
and organizational effectiveness in the process13.  
However, at its nucleus, value based leadership 
advocates the commitment of individuals to their 
deeply held values that in turn acts as a compass to 
guide decision-making. Using this metaphor, there is 
only one true north; doing the right thing.  
 
Values keep people focussed, direct them on long-term 
vision, and guide their choices when there is conflict14. 
Values such as respect, integrity, fairness, and honesty 
become the pillars for the organization. In turn, these 
values form the basis for a shared vision. James Kouzes 
and Barry Posner15 recognize that leaders must enlist 
others in a common vision by appealing to their values. 
Within the organization, these values “coalesce into a 
prevailing ideology that guides the organization’s 
behaviour”16. This ideology, or vision, creates a “focus 
on the identity of the organization, which when clearly 
communicated to every employee, helps orient team-
member decision making and activity”17. Margaret 
Wheatley uses the U.S. Army Special Forces as a 
powerful example where the vision of the organization 
guides quick decisions where access to commanders is 
impossible and appropriate choices of action must be 
made in a moments notice.  
                                                 
                                                13 O’Toole, James. (1995). Leading Change: Overcoming the Ideology of Comfort and 
the Tyranny of Custom. San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass Inc. 
14 Kouzes, James. (1995). Achieving Credibility: The Key to Effective Leadership. 
New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster Inc. 
15 Kouzes, James M. and Posner, Barry Z. (1995). The Leadership Challenge. San  
       Franscisco, Calif.: Jossey- Bass Inc. 
16 Nanus, Bert (1989). The Leader’s Edge. Chicago, Ill.: Contemporary Books, Inc., 
p.64. 
17 Wheatley, Margaret (1995). Margaret Wheatley’s Lessons From a Workplace. 
CRM Films. 
 
Thus, an organization that leads by values has only one 
boss; the values18. The result is an organizational 
environment with committed employees guided by 
established moral and ethical values. Although some 
argue that value based leadership is weak and 
ineffective, its strength lies in protecting the internal 
integrity of the organization fostered by an 
atmosphere of mutual respect and collaboration.  
 
Protecting the Follower 
 
A leader must protect the uniqueness of the follower. 
Followers must be viewed as individuals with their own 
hopes and dreams and must not be used as the means to 
justify the ends. Leaders must strengthen their 
followers by empowering them, providing choice, 
developing competence, and offering visible support19. 
In addition, the leader must not allow the follower to 
go below their personal bottom line. Just as the leader 
must demonstrate character and the courage of their 
convictions, the leader must protect the follower by 
not allowing the follower to compromise the shared 
organizational values.  
 
Protecting the Relationship 
 
Early theories of leadership focussed on personal traits 
and behaviour patterns of leaders. Today, the focus is 
on the interactions, or relationships, between the 
leader and their followers. Effective leadership 
requires the inclusion of all individuals; it is a dialogue, 
not a monologue20. An authentic leader “treats each 
follower as an individual and provides coaching, 
mentoring and growth opportunities”21. In this vein, 
leadership requires open communication and trust with 
employees. The effective leader focuses on people, 
ensuring they have adequate resources to fulfil their 
targets. They encourage openness to diverse points of 
view and solicit valid feedback from as many sources as 
 
18 Blanchard, Ken and O’Connor, Michael. (1997). Managing By Values. San Francisco, 
Calif.: Berrett-Koehler Publishers 
19 Kouzes, James. (1995). Achieving Credibility: The Key to Effective Leadership. 
New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster Inc. 
20 Kouzes, James. (1995). Achieving Credibility: The Key to Effective Leadership. 
New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster Inc. 
21 Bass, Bernard M.; Steidlmeier, Paul (1999). Ethics, Character, and Authentic 
Transformational Leadership Behaviour. Leadership Quarterly, Summer99, Vol 10, 
Issue 2, p181. 
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 possible22. It is through this process that a shared 
sense of community develops and followers are 
provided and enjoy the opportunity to make a worthy 
contribution to the organization23. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The challenge of a leader is to balance the act of 
serving with the act of protecting. Although serving 
may carry the connotation of submission, and 
conversely, protecting carries the connotation of 
dominance, the task of the leader is to engage in both 
activities to the appropriate degree. Leading by serving 
is not acting as a  “doormat”, but requires courage, 
commitment, and character in meeting the followers’ 
needs. Protecting is not about exercising authoritative 
control, but involves collaboration, mutual respect, and 
shielding the integrity of the relationship. Between this 
paradox of serving and protecting lies an effective 
leader.  
 
NO PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT 
RECORDS PROVIDED TO SOCIAL 
ASSISTANCE AGENCY 
R. v. D’Amour, 
(2002) Docket: C35927 (OntCA) 
 
The accused, who was unemployed, 
applied for and received social 
assistance under Ontario’s General 
Welfare Assistance Act. Shortly 
thereafter, she commenced and 
continued employment for the next two years without 
reporting her earnings to the Community Services 
Department (CSD). Had she reported this income, she 
would have had her benefits reduced. A caseworker 
with the CSD, who had received information that the 
accused had not reported her income, requested that 
she produce her T4 slips for the previous three years 
or her benefits would be withheld until she complied 
with the request. The T4 slips were provided to the 
CSD worker and it was determined that the accused 
had received her benefit cheques without reporting 
income. The matter was referred to the police for 
criminal prosecution along with copies of her T4 slips 
and other documentation. The police charged the 
accused with fraud and issued subpoenas for the 
original documentation from their various sources. She 
was convicted at trial.  
                                                 
22 Bennis, Warren and Townsend, Robert. (1991). Reinventing Leadership: 
Strategies to Empower Organization. New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster Inc. 
23 O’Toole, James. (1995). Leading Change: Overcoming the Ideology of Comfort 
and the Tyranny of Custom. San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass Inc. 
 
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing that her Charter rights under s.7 (self 
incrimination) and s.8 (search and seizure) had been 
violated because of the manner in which the 
documentation was obtained and that the evidence 
should be excluded under s.24(2). Although she 
accepted that the CSD could require her to produce 
income and employment information as a condition to 
receiving benefits and could also use that information 
for regulatory purposes, she contended that the Crown 
could not use the information in the criminal trial 
process. Although the Crown used original documents at 
trial, these originals would not have been subpoenaed 
but for the information contained in the copies she 
provided to CSD.  
 
Self Incrimination 
 
Section 7 of the Charter protects a person’s right not 
to be forced to assist the state in proving its case 
against them. Entrenched within this protection is the 
right of the individual to choose whether or not to co-
operate with the state. If a person chooses not to 
assist the state, they must be left alone. For example, 
where a person provides a compelled statement (either 
oral or written), that statement is conscripted and it, 
and any evidence derived from it, are equally protected. 
However, “documents that exist prior to, and 
independent of, any state compulsion do not…constitute 
evidence “created” by the person required to produce 
those documents. With certain narrow exceptions, 
neither the compelled production of such documents, 
nor the subsequent use in a criminal proceeding of such 
documents, attracts the protection of the principle 
against self-incrimination”. In rejecting the s.7 claim, 
Justice Doherty for the unanimous Court held: 
 
The T4 slips produced to [CSD] by the [accused] were 
created prior to, and entirely independent of, any 
compulsion that the Department may have exerted upon 
the appellant to produce those documents.  The [accused] 
was not under any statutory compulsion to create, or even 
keep, the T4 slips.  Indeed, the [accused] did not create 
the T4 slips but received a copy from her employer.  Even 
if it could be said that the state compelled the [accused] 
to produce the T4 slips, the T4 slips did not constitute 
evidence created by or emanating from the [accused].  The 
T4 slips existed entirely independent of the appellant.  
Production of them to the Department did not constitute 
self-incrimination.  The subsequent use of the T4 slips also 
did not implicate the principle against self-incrimination.  
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 The prosecution did not seek to use possession of the T4 
slips by the [accused] for any communicative purpose, such 
as to prove knowledge or to imply an admission against 
interest.  The documents spoke for themselves and 
constituted evidence of employment income. 
 
Search and Seizure 
 
Section 8 of the Charter protects a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy. In this case, the 
accused recognized that she did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy if the T4 slips were only used 
for determining her benefit eligibility or to prosecute 
her for breaches of the provincial statute. However, 
she argued that once the police obtained the 
documents an unreasonable seizure occurred because 
she had a reasonable expectation that the documents 
would not be given to the police in furtherance of a 
criminal prosecution. Even though in some cases the 
difference between regulatory enforcement and the 
criminal process has constitutional consequences, in 
this case the reasonable person could not expect that 
the documents provided to CSD would not be used in 
criminal proceedings involving the fraudulent receipt of 
benefits. Where the prosecution took place, either in 
provincial offences court or criminal court, made no 
difference in whether the person would have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. The nature of the 
state conduct did not change; it was the same 
allegation (fraudulent receipt of benefits) but to 
different degrees (criminal v. provincial). Since the 
accused did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, s.8 was not engaged and the evidence was 
admissible. Her appeal from conviction was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
POLICE ACADEMY INSTRUCTOR 
TOP COP AT SHOOTING 
COMPETITION 
 
The British Columbia PPC 
Provincial Championship Shooting 
Tournament was held at the Port 
Coquitlam and District Hunting 
and Fishing Club range during the August long weekend.  
RCMP Sgt. Steve Wade, firearms instructor at the 
Police Academy, was one of the many competitors.  Sgt. 
Wade came in first place in the Distinguished Master 
classification of the Duty Pistol event and was the top 
Police Officer in the Duty Pistol class of the 
tournament.    
SEARCH OF PRISONER’s MAIL 
REASONABLE: NO 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
R. v. Lamirande & Guimond, 
2002 MBCA 41 
 
The accused Lamirande and Guimond 
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September 2002 were arrested, along with others, 
and charged with the murder of a 
store employee during the course of 
a robbery. Lamirande appealed her 
anslaughter conviction arguing, in part, that her right 
o be free from unreasonable search and seizure had 
een violated when the police examined her documents 
hen she was admitted to a correctional institution. 
uimond appealed, among other grounds, that his right 
o silence had been violated when the police persisted 
n questioning him after he told them he did not wish to 
peak and for not being told the interview was being 
ideo recorded.   
earch and Seizure (Lamirande) 
amirande was lodged by the police at a remand centre 
nd was then transferred by correctional authorities to 
 correctional institution. Upon admission to the 
orrectional institution, her personal property was 
earched including her mail, which was opened. The 
rown argued that some of the documents, which were 
otes and poetry, contained references confirming that 
he accused was associated to an aboriginal street gang 
the Indian Posse) and provided statements from which 
 jury could draw inferences she had knowledge of the 
obbery. The accused was convicted at trial, but 
ppealed to the Manitoba Court of Appeal arguing that 
he search of her mail violated her right to be secure 
rom unreasonable state intrusion, a protected right 
nder s.8 of the Charter.  
lthough Lamirande was an incarcerated prisoner and 
greed that a search for weapons or contraband was 
alid, she argued that the documents were private and 
he maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
hem. This, it was suggested, prevented the authorities 
rom reading them. On the other hand, the Crown 
sserted that Lamirande had a gang association and the 
rovince of Manitoba not only had an extensive 
ontraband and search policy created pursuant to the 
rovincial Corrections Act, but also an institutional 
ang Management Strategy which prohibited the 
8
 possession of gang paraphernalia in any form, including 
“poems or documents evidencing gang involvement or 
activities”.  Furthermore, the Crown submitted, 
correctional facilities have an interest in safety and 
security and the power to search, inspect, and read 
documents flowed naturally from this objective. In 
addition, the Crown asserted that the accused was 
aware of the search procedures from a previous matter 
where she entered the correctional institution and that 
she knew any document in her possession would be 
seized and read.  Thus, it was argued, the accused did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
 
The right to be secure against unreasonable search and 
seizure is only triggered when a person can 
demonstrate they had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. In determining whether a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the court must use a 
“’totality’ of circumstances through a ‘multi-factor 
analysis’”. Chief Justice Scott, for the unanimous 
Manitoba Court of Appeal, agreed with the trial judge 
that “there was no expectation of privacy given the 
inherent nature of a prison facility and the documents 
themselves”. The “relationship between the parties (jail 
keeper and accused), the place where the information 
was obtained (prison), the manner in which it was 
obtained (a search upon admission), and the seriousness 
of the crime (manslaughter)” formed the context 
against which the expectation was to be assessed. 
Without an expectation of privacy, s.8 was not engaged 
and this ground of appeal was dismissed. 
 
Right to Silence (Guimond) 
 
Following the accused Guimond’s arrest, two separate 
teams of police officers interviewed him. Although the 
interview was videotaped, the police did not specifically 
advise him of this despite standard police policy to 
seek permission from the detainee before videotaping. 
Guimond argued that the police violated his right to 
silence by tricking him into talking, since he did not 
know the interview was being recorded. He submitted 
that the police told him the statement would be taken 
down in writing and deliberately lulled him into a false 
sense of security by leaving their notebooks outside 
the room knowing the interview was being recorded. 
Furthermore, he asserted that the police continued to 
question him despite his desire not to speak which was 
communicated to the police several times. The trial 
judge concluded that the error in not informing the 
accused of the recording was inadvertent, that he was 
fully aware the interview was being videotaped (the 
camera was in plain view), and that the statements were 
not induced by the police. Thus, the interview was 
admitted into evidence. 
 
The right to silence entrenched in s.7 of the Charter 
protects a person’s right in making a meaningful choice 
as to whether to speak to the police or not. Guimond 
was told on arrest of both his right to counsel under 
s.10(b) as well as that he was “not bound to say 
anything”. In rejecting this portion of his argument, 
Chief Justice Scott stated: 
 
Guimond’s fundamental right to make a free and 
meaningful choice whether to speak or remain silent was 
not violated. He was fully informed, and chose to speak to 
two teams of police officers at length about the facts 
surrounding the robbery. He could not have believed for 
an instant that his responses to the police officers were 
off the record or that no record of the conversation was 
being or could be made. Whether in the end the 
conversation was recorded, or written down by hand, or 
notes were made later, Guimond was well aware that he 
was speaking “on the record”. There is no air of reality in 
the assertion that Guimond was somehow misled by the 
police when he was told that anything he said will “be 
taken down in writing and used as evidence”. He knew he 
did not have to speak to the police. 
 
The Manitoba Court of Appeal also upheld the trial 
judge’s finding that the accused’s statement was 
voluntary. Although police trickery may in some 
situations neither violate the right to silence nor 
undermine voluntariness, it may, if it shocks the 
community, render a statement inadmissible. However, 
this case was not such a case. The Court stated: 
 
Even if the police conduct had been deliberate in failing 
to advise Guimond of the fact his testimony was being 
videotaped, he was fully aware of his right to remain 
silent and chose not to do so. This is not a case…where 
the police engaged in a deliberate trick to induce the 
accused to talk. Here the choice was made freely, the 
only dispute being at best over the way in which the 
evidence was recorded. These circumstances would 
hardly “shock the community”. 
 
The accused’s appeals were dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
Editor’s note: An appeal in this decision has been filed 
with the Supreme Court of Canada. 
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 TRACE AMOUNT OF COCAINE 
INSUFFICIENT FOR 
CONVICTION 
R. v. Marusiak, 2002 ABQB 774 
 
The accused picked up a prostitute 
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Furthermore, for a charge of possession of cocaine, 
the court must be satisfied that the accused had the 
required knowledge or control of the drug. In this case, 
“the residue in the pipe was barely detectible, if at all, 
with the human eye, nor did it bear any weight that 
would qualify as a useable amount”. Justice Sullivan had 
“serious concerns over whether an individual can have 
requisite knowledge of, or control over, a substance of 
V
Sin his truck as he drove through an 
area of Calgary known as the “stroll”. 
After being asked for a cigarette by 
the prostitute, the accused gave his 
igarette package to her and she kept it until they 
rrived at a desolate area near some railroad tracks, 
hich was commonly frequented and used for 
xchanging sexual favours. While there, the accused 
oined in and smoked what he believed was cocaine from 
 crack pipe provided by the prostitute. Two uniformed 
olice officers approached the vehicle.  They identified 
hemselves and ran checks on the names of both the 
ccused and the prostitute. The police were led to 
elieve that the accused had narcotics in his vehicle 
fter the prostitute, who was in violation of the 
onditions of her recognizance, spoke to them. A 
earch of the accused’s truck and person was 
onducted and trace amounts of cocaine were found in 
he prostitutes crack pipe and in the accused’s 
igarette package.  The items were seized and the 
eight of the residue was negligible, weighing 0.0 
rams. Following a chemical analysis, it was determined 
he items contained trace amounts of cocaine and the 
ccused was convicted at trial of possession. The trial 
udge reasoned that the accused was at one point in 
ossession of a useable amount of cocaine (more than 
he residue which was left over) since he smoked a pipe 
ull of crack. The accused appealed his conviction to 
he Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench. 
ustice Sullivan concluded that the trial judge erred in 
is determination that there was sufficient evidence to 
upport the conviction. The doctrine of de minimus non 
urat lex (the law does not concern itself with trifles) 
hould have been applied. “The principle behind this 
ncient legal maxim in connection with narcotics is that 
he law should not concern itself with very small 
uantities of drugs” and may be applied where there 
re minute traces or residue (non useable or 
easurable quantities); particularly when “the very 
ature of the substance has changed in character so 
hat it can no longer be used for any purpose” (ie. 
urned after being smoked). 
such a minute, immeasurable, unusable quantity, a 
substance which that individual does not even realize is 
present”. Moreover, the pipe belonged to the prostitute 
and was left in the truck after she was removed by the 
police. There was sufficient doubt about whether the 
accused had control over the pipe. Likewise, there was 
insufficient evidence that the accused had knowledge 
of the cocaine inside his cigarette package. The 
prostitute had the package in her possession for a 
brief time and there was insufficient evidence to prove 
the accused was responsible for the trace amount of 
cocaine found within it.  
 
Finally, even though the accused testified he believed 
he was smoking crack cocaine, there was inconclusive 
evidence that was in fact what he had smoked. The 
Certificate of Analysis identified the nature of the 
trace amounts of substance found in the pipe, but could 
not demonstrate how or when it got there. Thus, 
Justice Sullivan held that the Certificate did not 
conclusively prove what the accused actually smoked. 
The conviction for possession of cocaine was set aside 
and an acquittal was entered. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
UNLAWFUL IMPAIRED ARREST 
NOT ARBITRARY 
R. v. Barci, 2002 BCPC 0327 
 
A police officer approached a 
o
t
d
a
h
a
d
s
T
olume 2 Issue 9 
eptember 2002 vehicle stopped in a parking lot after 
he had observed it being driven. 
While speaking to the driver, the 
fficer detected a strong odour of liquor coming from 
he vehicle, noted the accused’s eyes were watery with 
ilated pupils, and that his head “bobbed” as he looked 
round. The accused’s speech was thick and slurred and 
e had difficulty removing his wallet from his pocket 
nd producing his driver’s licence. After asking the 
river to step from the vehicle, the officer noted a 
trong smell of liquor emanating from the accused.   
he officer formed the opinion that the accused’s 
10
 ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by 
alcohol and placed him under arrest. He was 
handcuffed, placed in the police car, read his s.10 
Charter rights, read the breath demand, and issued a 
24-hour driving suspension under British Columbia’s 
Motor Vehicle Act. After being transported to the 
police station and subsequently providing samples of 
120mg% and 100mg%, the accused was released from 
custody on a Promise to Appear.  
 
During the voire dire, the officer testified that the 
accused had identified himself satisfactorily and there 
was no evidence at the scene to preserve nor did he 
need any other evidence beyond the breath samples to 
prosecute the impaired charge. Furthermore, there was 
no reason for the officer to believe that the accused 
would not attend court when served with the Promise 
to Appear. The accused argued that the arrest was 
unlawful because the officer failed to comply with 
s.495(2) of the Criminal Code and was therefore an 
arbitrary detention contrary to s.9 of the Charter. 
Thus, the evidence obtained as a result of the 
detention, including the breathalyser readings, should 
be inadmissible under s.24(2).  
 
The accused submitted that impaired driving is a 
hybrid offence and the officer was satisfied with the 
accused’s identity and no further evidence required 
securing or preserving.  As for the breath samples, the 
accused must comply with a lawful demand under s.254 
of the Code and an arrest is not necessary to ensure 
compliance with the demand. On the other hand, the 
Crown submitted that the “public interest” factors in 
s.495(2) is not an exhaustive list and must take into 
account “public policy considerations underlying the 
section”. The need to prevent the repetition of criminal 
offences was achieved by the arrest. Had the arrest 
not been made, the officer would have been unable to 
prevent the accused from entering his car and driving.  
 
Justice Lenaghan of the British Columbia Provincial 
Court held that the arrest was unlawful because the 
officer failed to comply with s.495(2) of the Code. 
Justice Lenaghan wrote: 
 
By his own admission, the officer knew the identity of 
the accused, was not concerned about securing or 
preserving evidence, and had no reason to believe that, if 
released, the defendant would not subsequently appear in 
court to be dealt with according to law. Nor, in the 
circumstances, could the officer have reasonably been 
concerned about the continuation or repetition of the 
offence of impaired driving or the commission of another 
criminal offence. Not only had he issued a 24-hour 
suspension to the defendant but, more importantly, had 
made a lawful demand to the defendant, pursuant to s. 
254 of the Criminal Code. (I am satisfied on all the 
evidence that the officer had the requisite reasonable 
and probable grounds to make the demand.) The 
defendant either had to comply with or, if he thought he 
had a reasonable excuse not to do so, refuse this demand. 
In either case, in my view, the defendant would have 
been taken from the scene to the police station. If he 
complied, his lawful duty was to accompany [the officer] 
to have the samples taken and analyzed. If he refused, 
then, in my view, based on the evidence before the court 
of the symptoms observed by the officer, [the officer] 
would have been justified in arresting the defendant for 
refusing to provide samples of his breath. The concerns 
expressed by Crown counsel are, therefore, on the 
evidence before me, unconvincing and could not justify 
the arrest of the defendant. 
 
However, not all unlawful arrests are arbitrary 
detentions under the Charter.  The Court stated: 
 
Each unlawful arrest must be considered on its own, 
taking into consideration all the surrounding 
circumstances. To amount to an arbitrary detention, 
there must be something capricious about the arrest so 
that it may be said that no reasonable person could 
genuinely have believed that grounds for the arrest 
existed, that is to say, there was a complete absence of 
reasonable and probable grounds. 
 
In this case, the actions of the officer in arresting the 
accused could not be regarded as capricious or 
arbitrary. Justice Lenaghan held that “[a]t its worst, 
[it] was an error made in good faith” while “[a]t its 
best, it was putting the cart briefly before the horse”. 
Thus, the detention was not arbitrary and the 
application to have the evidence ruled inadmissible was 
dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
CARELESS DRIVING DOES NOT 
REQUIRE PROOF OF MENS REA  
R. v. Morrison, 2002 YKCA 15 
 
The accused, who was driving at or 
near the speed limit, was convicted 
of careless driving under s.179 of 
Yukon’s Motor Vehicles Act when he 
struck an intoxicated pedestrian at 
night wearing dark clothing crossing a road mid block 
while it was snowing. There were other pedestrians in 
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 the area and the accused did not stop even though 
other vehicles were coming to a stop. Section 179 of 
the Act reads as follows: 
 
Every person who drives a vehicle on a highway 
(a) without due care and attention, or 
(b) without reasonable consideration for persons using the 
highway, 
is guilty of the offence of driving carelessly. 
 
The accused appealed to the Yukon Court of Appeal 
arguing that the verdict was unreasonable. He 
submitted that although he failed to meet the standard 
of care of the ordinary prudent driver in the 
circumstances, the trial judge failed to consider 
whether the accused was blameworthy.  
 
The Yukon Court of Appeal, in a unanimous judgement, 
dismissed the appeal. Careless driving is a strict 
liability offence not requiring proof of blameworthiness 
or mens rea. All that is necessary is that the Crown 
proves that the person committed the prohibited act. 
The accused would then have to prove he took all 
reasonable care (what a reasonable person would have 
done) to avoid the circumstances.  In this case, the 
trial judge found the accused breached the standard of 
conduct required by s.179 and therefore did the 
prohibited act.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
WARRANTLESS DWELLING 
ENTRY UNREASONABLE, BUT 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED 
R. v. David,  
(2002) Docket:C26614 (OntCA) 
 
Police entered a residence and found 
the bodies of two female adults and 
a child. One female adult (the 
accused’s mother) had died from 
sledgehammer blows to the head 
while the other adult female (the accused’s aunt) and 
her 10 year old son (the accused’s cousin) died as a 
result of ligature strangulation. Neighbours informed 
the police that the 21-year-old accused lived in an 
apartment during the week while attending university 
and would come home on the weekends. One neighbour 
told police they had seen the accused at the residence 
4 days before the bodies were discovered. After 
several unsuccessful attempts to contact the accused, 
police entered his apartment without a warrant 28 
hours after the bodies were discovered and after the 
police obtained an opinion from a justice of the peace 
that there were insufficient grounds for obtaining a 
warrant. While entering the apartment, the police 
observed bloodstained clothing. This was later seized 
under the authority of a warrant the police 
subsequently obtained based on the observations made 
during the warrantless entry. A DNA warrant was also 
obtained and a sample of the accused’s blood was 
seized for analysis. At trial, the accused was convicted 
of three counts of first-degree murder for the deaths 
of his mother, aunt, and cousin.  
 
The trial judge concluded that the warrantless entry 
was not authorized by statute and therefore violated 
the accused’s right to be secure against unreasonable 
search and seizure protected under s.8 of the Charter. 
However, he found the police acted in good faith and 
under exigent circumstances, which mitigated the 
seriousness of the breach. The police honestly and 
reasonably believed they should enter the accused’s 
apartment to check if he was a victim or to question 
him as a suspect, and limited their entry and search for 
those purposes. The police entered because “they were 
concerned not only with their duty to interview [the 
accused] as a possible perpetrator, but also with their 
duty to notify him as a next of kin of his family’s death, 
and also with their duty involving concerns for his 
safety as a possible victim”. Further, the blood stained 
clothing was real, non-conscriptive evidence found in 
plain view. The police would have had reasonable 
grounds to obtain a search warrant anyways based on 
evidence discovered at the crime scene. Thus, the 
clothing’s discovery was inevitable. The charge was 
serious and the bloodstained clothing and DNA analysis 
important pieces of evidence. The evidence was 
admissible because its admission would not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.  
 
The accused appealed his conviction to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal arguing in part, that the trial judge 
erred in failing to exclude the evidence resulting from 
the warrantless entry into the accused’s apartment. 
Although the accused conceded that the police may 
enter a home for the purpose of preserving life, he 
argued that the police did not have an objective basis 
for believing he was injured or dead within his 
apartment and therefore exigent circumstances did not 
exist. Moreover, even if the entry was authorized, the 
accused submitted that the plain view doctrine does 
not apply to police observations made during emergency 
entries of this nature.  
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 In dismissing the accused’s appeal, Justice Simmons for 
the unanimous Ontario Court of Appeal held the trial 
judge’s conclusions were not in error. The trial judge’s 
findings of exigent circumstances and good faith were 
supported by the evidence and he did not err in his 
s.24(2) analysis.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
LATE NIGHT HYDRO ENTRY 
UNREASONABLE, BUT 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED 
R. v. Pham, 2002 BCCA 503 
 
Police, executing a search warrant 
on a home to search for evidence of 
theft of electricity, discovered two 
rooms containing about 180 
marihuana plants, venting, lighting, and an electrical 
bypass. While the police were in the process of 
obtaining a second search warrant to seize the 
evidence of the grow operation, the accused entered 
the residence through a locked door. She was arrested 
and provided her s.10(b) Charter rights.  During a voire 
dire, a statement made by the accused was ruled 
inadmissible by the trial judge because of a s.10(b) 
violation. Although she had been advised of her right to 
counsel, the police did not give her access to a lawyer 
within a reasonable time.  
 
The trial judge also found that the first warrant was 
obtained in violation of the accused’s right under s.8 of 
the Charter to be protected against unreasonable 
search and seizure. The police relied upon the electrical 
meter readings made by a B.C. Hydro employee, which 
were taken at 1:28 am when he went onto the accused’s 
property. The B.C. Hydro and Power Authority Tariff 
only allows Hydro employees free access to meters if 
they enter at a reasonable time. The trial judge 
concluded that the time the employee went onto the 
property was not reasonable and therefore his entry 
amounted to a trespass. Since the Hydro employee was 
an agent of the Crown, his actions violated s.8 of the 
Charter and the meter reading was excised from the 
warrant. Without this evidence, there was insufficient 
grounds upon which to grant a warrant and it was 
consequently quashed. However, the evidence was ruled 
admissible under s.24(2) of the Charter. The trial 
judge found the police and the hydro employee acted in 
good faith and the trespass was onto the accused’s 
property, not into her home, which mitigated its 
seriousness. 
 
The accused subsequently appealed her convictions of 
possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking, 
production of marihuana, and theft of electricity 
arguing, in part, that the trial judge misapplied the 
proper analysis for exclusion. She submitted that the 
trial judges findings of good faith were unreasonable. 
In rejecting this ground of appeal, Justice Ryan for the 
unanimous British Columbia Court of Appeal held the 
trial judges findings were reasonable. The Hydro 
employee, who had not been directed by the police, 
believed he had the authority to enter onto the 
accused’s property at the time he did, the entry was 
disclosed by police in the information to obtain the 
warrant, and the police did not deliberately withhold 
anything from the justice of the peace. Justice Ryan 
also rejected the argument that the trial judge failed 
to consider the s.10(b) breach in admitting the 
evidence resulting from the search. In Justice Ryan’s 
view, there was not a sufficient connection between 
the s.10(b) violation and the s.8 breach for them to be 
considered together. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
INCOMPLETE RECORDING OF 
INTERVIEW DID NOT BREACH 
DISCLOSURE DUTY 
R. v. Jordan, 2002 BCCA 330 
 
The accused, who had previously 
been convicted of manslaughter for 
supplying a lethal amount of liquor to 
a female alcoholic, was placed on a 
recognizance under s.810.2 of the 
Criminal Code after a police officer swore an 
information that he had reasonable grounds to believe 
the accused would commit a personal injury offence. 
Following his arrest for breach, he was interviewed by 
the police, which was audio recorded. Unfortunately, 
the officer pushed the play instead of the record 
button, and the first 45 minutes on side one of the 
tape was blank. Realizing his mistake, the investigator 
made notes of the first half of the interview from 
memory. Although the Crown had no intention of 
entering the interview as evidence since it was 
exculpatory, the tape and notes were properly 
disclosed to the accused. At trial, the accused was 
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 convicted of two counts of breaching his recognizance. 
He appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
arguing, among other grounds, that the Crown breached 
its duty of disclosure by failing to preserve and 
disclose evidence, which deprived the accused from 
making full answer and defence which is protected 
under s.7 of the Charter. In rejecting this ground of 
appeal, Justice Donald, for the unanimous British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, stated: 
 
The Crown gave the [accused] what it had, including notes 
of the unrecorded part of the interview. Nothing that 
existed was withheld. While the police are well advised to 
record interviews like this, the law does not require them 
to do so. Here, the absence of a recording was 
inadvertent and the officer did his best to recall what 
the [accused] said. The error was inconsequential 
because the [accused’s] position was the same throughout 
the entire interview in maintaining his innocence.  
 
Thus, “the non-recording of the first half of the 
interview did not deprive the right to make full answer 
and defence”. Furthermore, the accused argued that 
because the officer suggested he could tell the 
accused’s side of the story in court if he gave a 
statement, this amounted to a binding commitment on 
the Crown to lead the exculpatory statement without 
the need of the accused testifying on his own behalf. 
Justice Donald found the accused “had the opportunity 
to put his version into evidence by giving sworn 
testimony, but he cannot force the Crown to lead an 
exculpatory statement in the circumstances of this 
case”.  
 
 
 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
UNINTENTIONAL ‘GATING’ 
PROCEDURE NOT AN ABUSE OF 
PROCESS 
R. v. Benson, 2002 BCCA 291 
 
The accused was originally charged 
with two counts of robbery for the 
removal of money from Liquor Store 
cash registers. About three months 
later a warrant was issued for his 
arrest. The accused was in custody at a correctional 
centre where he had been serving an unrelated 
sentence and the warrant was not executed until the 
day of his release, some two months after the warrant 
was issued. At trial, the accused was convicted of two 
counts of the lesser included offence of theft on the 
robbery charges. The accused appealed to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal contending, among other 
grounds, that the delay in issuing and executing the 
arrest warrant was an abuse of process. 
 
In referring to what he called “gating”, the accused 
argued that the police had reasonable grounds to 
charge him for the robbery offences, but the delay in 
issuing the warrant and subsequently executing it at 
the gate of the correctional centre on the day of his 
release amounted to an abuse of process and Charter 
violation. An affidavit was filed by the police, which 
outlined the chronology of events beginning with the 
initiation of the investigation. Although Justice 
Thackray for the unanimous appeal court called the 
accused’s gating submission interesting, he dismissed 
the accused’s appeal and stated: 
 
While the investigation did not proceed with great haste, 
I am satisfied that because of case loads, illness and an 
unexplained lack of information about the whereabouts 
of the [accused], the process was neither deliberately 
delayed nor designed to accomplish the gating procedure 
about which the [accused] complains. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
ABBOTSFORD POLICE WIN 
SOCCER GOLD AT NORTH 
AMERICAN CHAMPIONSHIP 
 
The Abbotsford Police Department 
(B.C.) won gold in the men’s 
recreational division at the 2002 
North American Police Soccer 
Championships held in Los Angeles, 
California from September 4th-8th. 
Representing the smallest police department in the 
tournament, Abbotsford was undefeated in five 
straight games and out scored their opponents 12-1. On 
their way to the final, Abbotsford was victorious over 
Ventura County (California), Halton Regional (Ontario), 
New Jersey, and Philadelphia. In the final, Abbotsford 
beat York Regional (Ontario) 2-0. The Soccer 
Championships hosts men and women law enforcement 
soccer teams from all over North America and 
Bermuda. Past host cities have 
included Abbotsford (1996), 
Philadelphia (1997), Bermuda 
(1998), Vancouver (1999), St. Louis 
(2000), and Toronto (2001). This 
was not Abbotsford’s first win in 
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 the competition. They won gold in 1999 and were 
runners up in 1996 and 2001. Next year’s tournament is 
in New York while the Abbotsford Police Department is 
scheduled to host the event in 2005. Congratulations!!!  
 
LIVING ON THE AVAILS 
PROVIDES FOUNDATION FOR 
POSSESSION OF CRIME 
PROPERTY & LAUNDERING  
R. v. Friesen, 2002 SKCA 32 
 
The accused, who ran an escort 
dispatching service, was convicted of 
two counts of living on the avails of 
prostitution of another person 
(s.212(1)(j) Criminal Code), but 
acquitted of possession of property over $5000 
obtained by crime (s.354(1) Criminal Code) and 
laundering proceeds of an enterprise crime offence 
(s.462.31(1) Criminal Code). The trial judge concluded 
that s.212(1)(j) could not provide the foundation for 
either of these offences. Crown appealed the acquittals 
to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal arguing that the 
trial judge misconceived the relationship between 
s.212(1)(j) and ss.354(1) and 462.31(1), and that this 
may affect future prosecutions of this nature.  
 
Possession of Property Obtained by Crime 
 
Section 212(1)(j) is targeted at those who parasitically 
live off the earnings of a prostitute and creates an 
offence for a person to live wholly, or in part, on the 
avails of prostitution. Section 354(1) makes it an 
offence for a person to be in possession of property 
knowing that it was obtained from the commission of an 
indictable offence. Justice Cameron, for the unanimous 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, held there was no 
reason why these two sections could not operate 
together. He stated: 
 
A person who lives parasitically, in whole or in part, on 
the earnings of a prostitute may, if that person comes 
in for a share of the earnings, acquire property 
therewith and be in possession of that property. That 
is what happened here. The [accused] routinely 
received a proportionate share of the earnings of the 
prostitutes, deposited her share into a bank account, 
and then withdrew money from time to time for the 
purposes, among others, of acquiring the house she 
lived in, a car, a piano, and so on. It is this property, 
acquired by her while living on and using the avails of 
prostitution for these and other purposes that formed 
the subject matter of the charge under s.354(1). In 
other words she was charged with the possession of 
this property, knowing it hade been obtained by or 
derived, directly or indirectly, from the commission of 
the offence of living on the avails of another’s 
prostitution.   
  
Laundering Proceeds of Crime 
 
Section 462.31(1) creates an offence for a person to 
use, deliver, dispose of, or otherwise deal with 
property or its proceeds with intent to conceal or 
convert it, knowing or believing that all or part of it 
was obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a 
result of the commission of an enterprise crime 
offence. An enterprise crime offence is defined as 
including an offence against s.212. If the accused 
laundered “her share of the prostitutes’ earnings by 
turning it into interests in a house, a car, a piano and so 
forth, with the intent and knowledge required by the 
section”, the trial judge should not have acquitted as he 
did. Both s.212(1)(j) and s.462.31(1) are capable of 
operating together. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
MINOR WARRANT DEFECT 
DOES NOT RENDER ITS 
EXECUTION UNREASONABLE 
R. v. Hebert,  
(2002) Docket:C35808 (OntCA) 
 
The police obtained a faxed copy of 
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contain the time after which the 
warrant could be executed. The 
officers confirmed by telephone 
that the warrant could be executed after 11:00am and 
did execute it after this time, when the accused was 
not present. The accused was found guilty but appealed 
his drug conviction to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing that the warrant was invalid and executed in a 
unreasonable manner. In dismissing the appeal, the 
Court found “the defect in the copy of the warrant had 
no effect on the way it was executed and in no way 
compromised the accused’s privacy interests or any 
right he may have had to know the contents of the 
warrant had he been present when it was executed”. 
The minor defect in the copy of the warrant did not 
render the manner in which the warrant was executed 
15
 unreasonable. Moreover, the fact the officer who 
swore the information to obtain the warrant did not 
identify the particular officer by name who provided 
him information was not significant and did not render 
the warrant invalid. Although “the officer could have 
been more precise in identifying which officer directly 
provided information to him”, the officer swore that all 
the officers provided reliable information. Similarly, 
the officer’s failure in fully detailing the criminal 
records of the three confidential informants was not 
fatal. There was no evidence that the partial details 
provided were inaccurate or that the full criminal 
records would have impacted the justice of the peace’s 
decision to grant the warrant. Furthermore, “the 
information provided by the confidential informants 
and the officers’ reasons for believing that information 
were sufficient when considered in their totality to 
justify the issuing of the warrant. There was some 
confirmation of material aspects of the information 
provided by the informants in the other parts of the 
information. The [accused] did live where the 
informants said he lived and he did have a record for 
drug trafficking”. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
BODILY HARM INCLUDES 
‘EMOTIONAL REPERCUSSIONS’ 
R. v. MacLeod, 2002 NSCA 24 
 
The accused was convicted by a jury 
of sexual assault causing bodily 
harm. He had met the victim at a bar 
and had been invited into her 
apartment for a drink or to smoke 
some hashish after the two had walked with each other 
from the bar. Sometime thereafter, the accused 
pinned the victim to her bed by straddling her and held 
her wrists while attempting to force his penis into her 
mouth. He also threatened to knock the victim’s teeth 
out if she did not keep quiet. During the struggle with 
the accused, the victim suffered bruises to her neck 
and arms that lasted a week and a number of small cuts 
to her face caused by the sharp edges of the rings she 
was wearing, one of which left a scar. Further, the 
victim was visibly shaken after the event and had 
testified she suffered emotionally, which adversely 
affected her willingness to be intimate in her current 
relationships. The accused appealed his conviction to 
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal arguing in part, that 
the injuries sustained by the victim were insufficient 
to meet the threshold of “bodily harm”.  
 
Bodily harm is defined in s.2 of the Criminal Code as 
“any hurt or injury to a person that interferes with the 
health or comfort of the person and that is more than 
merely transient or trifling in nature”. Bodily harm is 
not restricted to physical injury, but has been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada to include 
“psychological harm”24. In dismissing the accused’s 
appeal, Justice Saunders for the unanimous Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal noted the physical injuries in 
this case were at the low end of the scale. However, 
“relatively minor physical injuries” can constitute 
“bodily harm” in sexual assault cases and the injuries 
suffered by the victim were not trifling, considering 
the “emotional repercussions” experienced by the 
victim. As a result, there was adequate evidence upon 
which a jury could find the accused guilty of causing 
bodily harm while committing a sexual assault.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
UNLAWFUL DETENTION 
ARBITRARY, BUT STATEMENT 
ADMISSIBLE 
R. v. E.W., 2002 NFCA 49 
 
The accused was arrested for 
historical sexual offences at about 
6:00 pm., but did not appear before 
a justice of the peace until about 
5:46 pm. the following day.  After 
the accused was taken into custody, 
the police interviewed his estranged wife which was 
completed at about midnight.  However, during the next 
morning and up until 3:20 pm. that afternoon, the police 
took no action with the investigation.  Furthermore, 
there was no explanation of why the police waited until 
the afternoon to ask the accused if he would provide a 
statement. At the time he was brought before a 
justice, the accused was providing a statement to the 
police. After completing the statement the accused 
was granted judicial interim release with conditions.   
 
The accused argued that he had been arbitrarily 
detained when he was arrested and unlawfully held in 
custody for almost 24 hours before appearing before a 
justice.  Had the interview not been interrupted to 
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24 R. v. McGraw [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72 
 permit the hearing before a justice of the peace, the 
24-hour time limitation imposed by s. 503(1) of the 
Code would have been breached. The trial judge 
concluded that the accused was not arbitrarily 
detained and he was convicted of the sexual offences 
for which he was charged. The accused appealed to the 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal arguing, among other 
grounds, that the trial judge erred in concluding that 
the accused was not arbitrarily detained in violation of 
s.9 of the Charter.  
 
Arbitrary Detention 
 
Section 503 of the Criminal Code guarantees the 
accused an opportunity to seek release from custody 
and requires that a person held by police be brought 
before a justice without unreasonable delay and in any 
event within 24 hours.  What constitutes unreasonable 
delay will depend on the particular facts of the case 
and the 24-hour time limitation is the outer limit of 
permissible detention.  In some cases, even though 24 
hours has not expired an unreasonable delay could 
nevertheless occur.  In this case the police were unable 
to explain the delay in interviewing the accused. There 
was “no evidence that the delay was due to other 
demands that affected the ability of the police to deal 
with [the accused] or the investigation expeditiously”. 
Justice Welsh, for the unanimous Newfoundland Court 
of Appeal, held: 
 
Where there has been a delay in taking an arrested 
person before a justice of the peace, that delay must be 
justified as reasonable.  Justification requires an 
evidentiary foundation.  In this case there is no 
explanation for more than six daytime hours during which 
[the accused] was held in custody.  This is a significant 
period of time particularly when considered in light of 
the purpose of section 503(1).  
 
In the result, the conclusion was followed that [the 
accused’s] detention contravened section 503(1) of the 
Criminal Code. His detention was, therefore, unlawful. 
 
That unlawful detention also constituted an arbitrary 
detention under section 9 of the Charter. The violation 
of section 503(1) was not a mere technical error. Nor was 
it explained by activities of or exigencies faced by the 
police. [The accused] had the fundamental right to have 
his detention assessed by a justice of the peace without 
unreasonable delay. 
 
The Court found that “the length of the delay, the 
surrounding circumstances, and the failure of the 
police to account in any way for their failure to bring 
[the accused] before a justice of the police without 
unreasonable delay resulted in an arbitrary detention”. 
Thus, his right under s.9 of the Charter was violated. 
 
Statement Admissibility  
 
The accused argued that the statement made by him 
should be ruled inadmissible under s.24(2) of the 
Charter as remedy for the s.9 breach. In assessing 
whether the statement was admissible, the Court would 
(1) have to determine whether there was a causal link 
between the s.9 Charter violation and the statement 
and if so, (2) would the administration of justice be 
brought into disrepute if it were to be admitted into 
evidence. Bearing in mind that the delay in obtaining a 
statement is not by itself sufficient to establish a 
causal connection, under the first prong of the analysis 
the accused would have to demonstrate that he would 
not have provided the statement to police if he had not 
been detained until the late afternoon. The accused 
was unable to establish that his detention at the point 
it became arbitrary had any relationship with or 
connection to him providing a statement.  There was no 
oppressive of improper conduct by the police nor was 
the delay in bringing the accused before a justice 
designed to increase the likelihood of obtaining a 
statement. Since the accused was unable to prove the 
necessary causal connection between the arbitrary 
detention and the giving of his statement, s.24(2) was 
not engaged and the statement was admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
NON-PRESUMPTIVE CARE & 
CONTROL REQUIRES RISK OF 
DANGER 
R. v. Burbella, 2002 MBCA 106 
 
The accused re-attended the 
accident scene where he had driven 
his vehicle into a snow filled ditch, 
which caused extensive damage to 
his vehicle and rendered it wholly 
inoperable. When the tow truck and police arrived, the 
accused got behind the wheel of the vehicle at the 
request of the tow truck operator and turned the 
engine on to disengage the steering mechanism which 
assisted with the recovery of the vehicle. When the 
accused exited the vehicle, he was promptly arrested 
by police and charged with care and control of a motor 
vehicle while impaired. At trial, the accused did not 
dispute that he was impaired but testified that he had 
consumed alcohol after the accident and prior to his 
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 re-attendance at the scene. The accused was convicted 
by the trial judge, but appealed to the Manitoba Court 
of Appeal arguing that there was no risk of the vehicle 
being put in motion and therefore his conduct did not 
constitute a danger to the public, the evil s.253 of the 
Criminal Code is intended to address.  
 
After examining several Supreme Court of Canada 
judgements, Chief Justice Scott for the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal concluded that the “purpose of [s.253 
of the Code] is to protect the public from the danger 
which can occur when an impaired person gains control 
of a motor vehicle”. Furthermore, “the risk of putting a 
vehicle in motion so that it could become dangerous 
is…an element of care and control, which is the 
risk…the care and control legislation seeks to prevent”.  
 
There are two methods by which the Crown can prove 
care and control; (1) by resorting to the presumption 
found in s.258(1)(a) of the Code (occupant of the 
driver’s seat) or (2) by proving actual (non-presumptive) 
care and control. If the Crown uses the care and 
control presumption, the absence of danger will not 
afford a defence. However, an intention not to drive 
may rebut this presumption. If rebutted, the Crown can 
nonetheless seek a conviction if it can be proven that 
the accused was in actual care and control.  
 
Where the Crown relies on actual care and control 
short of driving, they must demonstrate the accused 
engaged in “acts which involve some use of the car or 
its fittings and equipment, or some course of conduct 
associated with the vehicle which would involve a risk 
of putting the vehicle in motion so that it could become 
dangerous25”. In this case, non-presumptive care and 
control had not been proven. The Crown was unable to 
rely on the presumption nor was the necessary element 
of danger present to prove actual care and control. The 
accused’s conviction was overturned and an acquittal 
was entered.   
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Arguably, as a parolee, he has or should have a much 
reduced expectation of privacy and should be subject 
to police scrutiny and some searching that would be 
unacceptable with respect to citizens who are not 
under sentence26”. OntCJ Justice Duncan 
                                                 
25 R. v. Ford [1982] 1 S.C.R. 231 
26 R. v. Catroppa, [2002] O.J. No. 3399 (OntCJ) 
 
PAROLEE VEHICLE SEARCH 
UNREASONABLE, BUT 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED 
R. v. Catroppa,  
[2002] O.J. No. 3399 (OntCJ) 
 
After stopping the accused driving, 
a police officer queried him on CPIC 
and learned that there was a parole 
suspension warrant outstanding. The 
accused was arrested, handcuffed, 
and placed in the police car. The officer returned to 
the accused’s car, searched it, and found a flick knife 
in a lidded console, which the officer had to open, 
between the front seats. The evidence was that officer 
searched the vehicle without a warrant “incident to 
arrest and for valuables, since [the vehicle] was being 
seized”. The accused was subsequently charged with 
possession of a prohibited weapon (the flick knife). At 
trial the accused argued, in part, that he was the 
subject of an unreasonable search and seizure contrary 
to s.8 of the Charter.  He suggested that “the search 
incident to arrest power was not available [to the 
officer], since the underlying purposes for that power 
were not applicable nor in the arresting officer’s mind” 
at the time of the search. The Crown sought to justify 
the search both as an incident to arrest and as an 
“inventory search”.  
 
Search Incident to Arrest 
 
Although the arrest itself was proper, Justice Duncan 
of the Ontario Court of Justice found the search to be 
unreasonable as an incident to arrest. Searches 
incident to arrest can be for the purpose of finding 
evidence of an offence or for safety. In this case, the 
accused was not arrested for an offence (it was a 
parole suspension warrant) and “officer safety was not 
a concern as the [accused] was already in custody, 
handcuffed in the patrol car”.  
 
Inventory Search 
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The Crown also failed to justify the search as an 
“inventory search”. Although Justice Duncan held that 
“the police have authority to enter [a lawfully seized] 
vehicle for the purpose of itemizing and safeguarding 
objects in plain view and the driver has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in respect of such a search”, the 
officer had to open the closed console to locate the 
knife. The inventory search is restricted to itemizing 
 visible valuables and does not authorize searches 
beyond plain view. To the extent the officer exceeded 
the “plain view” scope of the inventory search, the 
opening of the closed console was unreasonable and 
violated the accused’s protections under s.8 of the 
Charter. 
 
Evidence Admissibility 
 
Even though he found a Charter breach, Justice Duncan 
nonetheless admitted the evidence. The violation was 
not serious. There was a significantly reduced 
expectation of privacy, the search was brief, minimally 
intrusive, and it “barely crossed the line”. Furthermore, 
the knife was reliable evidence and necessary for a 
successful prosecution.  
 
DETENTION & SEARCH 
UNLAWFUL: POLICE LACK 
ARTICULABLE CAUSE 
R. v. Savory,  
[2002] O.J. No. 2715 (OntCJ) 
 
Two police officers on routine patrol 
in a high drug and related crime area 
stopped at a coffee shop. They used 
a technique where one officer would 
enter a door, and anyone who 
attempted to leave upon the police entering would be 
intercepted by the second officer at another door. At 
the coffee shop, one officer entered the west door and 
the accused was seen exiting out a second door. At the 
same time, the female shop owner pointed at the 
accused, as he was leaving. The second officer saw the 
accused leaving. The owner was  pointing at the accused 
while looking at police. The officer observed the man, 
now in the entrance of a neighbouring store, look out 
and duck back into the entranceway. The officer 
approached the man and asked him to come back into 
the coffee shop. As they re-entered the coffee shop, 
the police heard the shop owner, who did not speak 
good English, mention the word “threaten” as she 
pointed at the accused. The man said he had no 
identification and the officer searched his pockets. 
Although no identification was found, the officer did 
find crumpled money. While being searched, the 
accused verbally identified himself.  
 
He was subsequently arrested for investigation of 
threatening. After finding the crumpled money in the 
accused’s pockets, the police became very suspicious 
that he may be involved in drug activity. The accused 
was told to open his mouth and lift his tongue. Although 
he merely wiggled his tongue, an officer observed the 
glimpse of a piece of crack cocaine wrapped in plastic. 
The accused was arrested for possession of crack 
cocaine, but the accused attempted to swallow the 
drugs. An officer applied pressure under the accused’s 
cheekbones to prevent him from swallowing. The second 
officer yelled at the accused to spit the crack out and 
tried to get his hands around the accused’s throat. 
During the struggle in which both officers sustained 
cuts to their hands from the clawing of the accused, he 
successfully swallowed the contents of his mouth. No 
further attempt was made to retrieve or detect the 
presence of drugs from within the accused. At trial, 
the accused made an application that the evidence be 
inadmissible because the police violated his s.8 (search 
and seizure) and s.9 (arbitrary detention) rights under 
the Charter.  
 
The Detention 
 
The first step in determining whether s.9 has been 
violated is whether there was in fact a detention. 
Justice Shamai of the Ontario Court of Justice 
concluded that the accused had been detained when he 
was asked to accompany the officer back into the 
coffee shop. The accused was a young black man on 
foot in a high crime area. Although race was not an 
issue in the investigation itself, the issue of race can 
be a significant factor in determining whether the 
accused exercised free choice. Having found the 
accused detained, the Court then examined whether 
the detention was arbitrary. For a detention not to be 
arbitrary, the police must have at minimum an 
articulable cause. Although the accused’s actions were 
suspicious (“he concealed himself in a doorway after 
exiting the donut shop upon the entry of the police 
officers”), the police did not have an articulable cause 
to detain him. Justice Shamai stated: 
 
In the case at bar, I am of the view that while [the 
officer] was in execution of his duties in following [the 
accused] while his partner investigated the gesture of 
the shop owner.   [The officer] was entitled to pursue his 
duties by asking questions of [the accused].  In these 
circumstances, he had nothing amounting to articulable 
cause….  He didn't know what sort of criminal conduct he 
was investigating.  He only knew that the shop owner…was 
pointing at [the accused] as he left the store, and that 
the store was located in an area whose law abiding 
citizens and business owners had asked police for help 
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 against drug users and dealers and other criminals.  At 
the point where he asked [the accused] to accompany him 
back into the store he was in fact asking him to help the 
police know why the shop owner pointed at [the accused] 
when he left.  He had no knowledge of an offence; he was 
enlisting [the accused] in finding out whether he had 
done something wrong.  Although he describes [the 
accused] as co-operative and coming voluntarily, my view 
is that realistically [the accused] had no choice.  The fact 
that he did not fight nor did he protest is not evidence 
to the contrary, especially as his rights on detention, or 
his choices, were in no way described to him.  In these 
circumstances, requiring him to do what the officer 
wanted, without articulable cause, amounted to an 
arbitrary detention. 
 
The Search 
 
Since the stop on the street was an arbitrary 
detention, the search could not be justified as an 
incident thereto. Even if it could be argued that the 
police did have articulable cause, a search would only be 
justified on officer safety grounds arising in the 
circumstances. In this case, the Court concluded the 
“search had nothing to do with officer safety” and 
stated: 
 
[P]olice action in connection with a properly founded 
detention must be determined contextually.  The British 
Columbia Court of Appeal [has limited the ambit of 
search powers permissible on a proper detention] to the 
requirements of the offence being investigated, and at 
most, to issues of officer safety raised by the 
circumstances.  Here, [he accused] was searched for the 
purpose of ascertaining his identity.  He gave his name as 
he was being searched.  That should have enabled the 
next proper stage of investigation.  In my view there was 
no proper reason for a search of his pockets to be 
conducted as and when it was.  At best, a search could be 
justified in ensuring officer safety through the 
investigation of the offence.  No issue as stated in terms 
of officer safety:  the search was explicitly for the 
purposes of aiding in the identification of [the 
accused].  The discovery of crumpled Canadian currency 
was outside the ambit of any proper search: there was no 
proper search at this stage.  To further intrude into [the 
accused’s] security of the person by attempting to 
search his mouth and requiring him to lift his tongue in a 
certain manner, then grabbing his throat and his face to 
make him spit and/or not swallow are entirely 
unwarranted and unreasonable actions in the 
circumstances. 
 
I might say that the only point of the officers' testimony 
on which I seriously doubted their good faith was when 
[the officer] said he wanted to remove the suspected 
cocaine from [the accused’s] mouth for [the accused’s] 
protection. No further action was taken by the police to 
assist [the accused] once the officers were convinced 
that he had swallowed the cocaine, the very thing they 
were trying to guard against, to take their evidence at 
face value.  As to the rest of their actions, I have the 
impression that they believe their powers to be much 
broader than the prescriptions of common-law and 
constitution show them to be. 
 
The search here exceeds constitutional bounds and 
amounts to a gross invasion of [the accused’s] privacy and 
bodily integrity, not to mention his dignity.  The demand 
for [the accused] to open his mouth was unrelated to the 
only lawful and limited purpose for which an unwarranted 
search might have been performed in these 
circumstances.  Once an unlawful and unwarranted search 
was underway, to further explore [the accused’s] body 
cavity, his mouth, in the middle of a restaurant, was a 
serious overstepping of police authority to search.  Even 
if some search might have been permissible pursuant to 
the detention for articulable cause, the steps taken by 
the officers far exceeded that boundary. 
 
Furthermore, the search could not be justified as an 
incident to arrest. Neither police officer had 
reasonable grounds (subjective/objective 
circumstances) upon which to base an arrest nor could 
they state what the offence was that they believed 
had been committed. Even though the “police are 
entitled to investigate further after an arrest is 
made”, in this case the officer did not make an arrest 
for an offence, but arrested for investigation. The 
accused successfully satisfied the court that his rights 
under s.8 and 9 of the Charter had been infringed. 
 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“The duties which a police officer owes to the state 
are of a most exacting nature. No one is compelled to 
choose the profession of a police officer, but having 
chosen it, everyone is obliged to live up to the standard 
of its requirements. To join in that high enterprise 
means the surrender of much individual freedom”. 
Calvin Coolidge (1872-1933)  
 
  
For comments on or contributions to this 
newsletter contact  
Sgt. Mike Novakowski at the JIBC Police Academy 
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